All circuits use Groth16 zk-SNARKs (BN128 curve). Artifacts (WASM + zkey + vkey) are served from zkrune.com/circuits/. Each entry below shows the public/private inputs.

Identity

age-verification — self-asserted

Prove minimum age without revealing birth year.

Artifacts: age-verification.wasm · age-verification.zkey · age-verification_vkey.json

membership-proof — production

Prove group membership via Merkle inclusion (depth=16, Poseidon).

credential-proof — issuer-attested

Prove you hold an unexpired credential an issuer attested to, without revealing the credential.

At issuance the issuer publishes expectedHash = Poseidon(credentialSecret, validUntil) and gives the holder the secret. The circuit checks that the private inputs open that commitment and that the credential has not expired, so only a real holder can produce a proof. Because validUntil is hashed into the commitment, the expiry cannot be extended independently.

zkRune verifies the issuer's attestation. It does not establish the underlying claim — that remains the issuer's responsibility.

anonymous-reputation — self-asserted

Prove reputation score exceeds threshold anonymously.

Financial

balance-proof — production

Prove balance exceeds threshold (attested when wallet connected).

range-proof — self-asserted

Prove a value is within a range.

token-swap — self-asserted

Prove swap eligibility without revealing balance.

nft-ownership — self-asserted

Prove NFT ownership without revealing which one.

whale-holder — self-asserted

Prove whale-level holdings without revealing amount.

Governance

private-voting — production

Cast verifiable vote without revealing identity.

quadratic-voting — self-asserted

Quadratic vote weighted by token balance.

Cryptographic

hash-preimage — production

Prove knowledge of a hash preimage.

signature-verification — production

Verify EdDSA signature inside a ZK circuit.

patience-proof — production

Prove minimum wait period elapsed.

rwa-eligibility — issuer-attested

Prove an issuer attested you are eligible for a regulated offering, without revealing who you are, where you live, or what tier you hold.

The trust anchor is the issuer's public key. A venue configures the transfer agent or KYC provider it already relies on, once, and every credential that issuer signs verifies against it — there is no per-investor commitment to publish and no root to refresh as investors are onboarded.

The holder generates the subject secret and sends only a commitment to the issuer, so the issuer signs a claim about a commitment it cannot open. It cannot prove eligibility on an investor's behalf, and a breach of issuer records yields no usable credentials.

Four things are proven at once: the issuer signed this exact claim, the prover knows the secret behind the commitment, the tier clears the offering's bar, and the country is on the venue's allowlist. Each proof is bound to a session nonce the verifier issues, so a captured proof cannot be replayed elsewhere.

The published nullifier is deterministic per investor per offering. A gate can enforce one entry each without being able to follow that investor anywhere else.

Credentials carry a validity window and no revocation list. Until revocation ships, issue short-lived credentials and re-issue on demand.

lockup-proof — agent-attested

Prove a transfer restriction has elapsed and the position still meets a venue minimum, without revealing the size of the position or whose it is.

The transfer agent publishes a Merkle root over the positions it recorded. Both the amount and the unlock date are hashed into the leaf, so a holder can neither inflate the position nor bring the unlock date forward.