eIDAS 2.0 · EUDI Wallet · Rolling out 2026–2027

Open-source ZK selective disclosure for EUDI Wallet implementers.

zkRune is the privacy-preserving cryptographic layer underneath EUDI-conformant wallets, attestation issuers, and relying parties. 14 production Groth16 circuits, mainnet verifier anchors on three chains, MIT-licensed. We do not build a wallet — we make yours ARF-compliant on the ZK primitives.

Outside the EUDI Wallet scope? See the full regulations matrix (AI Act, DSA, MiCA, DORA, NIS2, UK OSA, GDPR).

The opportunity

Every EU member state must issue an identity wallet. The wallet must support selective disclosure. Most of them do not yet.

eIDAS 2.0 (Regulation (EU) 2024/1183) requires member states to make a European Digital Identity Wallet available to every citizen and resident. The Architecture Reference Framework explicitly cites zero-knowledge proofs as a valid mechanism for attribute selective disclosure. The implementation gap between the spec and shipped wallets is real, and shrinking quickly.

What every wallet needs
  • • Prove `age >= N` without revealing the birthdate
  • • Prove residency without revealing the full address
  • • Prove credential validity without revealing its body
  • • Stay unlinkable across relying parties
  • • All of the above, audit-grade, today
What zkRune already ships
  • • 14 production Groth16 circuits
  • • In-browser WASM proving (0.4–5 s)
  • • Hosted verifier API + OpenAPI 3.1 spec
  • • Mainnet verifier contracts on three chains
  • • MIT / Apache-2.0, audit-friendly source

We are not building an EUDI Wallet. We make existing wallets, issuers, and relying parties ARF-compliant on the cryptographic primitives. The wallet UX, key management, biometrics, and qualified-status approval remain yours.

Who we serve

Three places where ARF-aligned ZK is now table stakes.

Wallet implementers

TSPs, identity vendors, member-state pilot consortia (Atos, Bundesdruckerei, Thales, IDnow, Talao, Walt.id, ANF AC)

Drop zkRune circuits into your selective-disclosure pipeline. The wallet keeps full control of key management, biometric onboarding, attestation issuance, and the qualified-status approval process — we provide the ZK proving + verification primitives. MIT licence, audit-friendly, no vendor lock-in.

Attestation issuers

Member-state authorities, qualified trust service providers, universities, professional bodies, employers

Issue ARF-compliant Electronic Attestations of Attributes (EAA) that holders can prove selectively. zkRune's `credential-proof` and `signature-verification` circuits handle the cryptographic binding so your attestations remain valid across wallets and relying parties without revealing the underlying credential.

Relying parties

Banks, telco operators, online platforms, healthcare providers, public-service portals

Accept proofs from any EUDI-conformant wallet without rebuilding cryptography. Verify on-chain (Solana / Ethereum / Sui) or via the hosted `POST /api/verify-proof` endpoint. The OpenAPI spec at /openapi.yaml maps to Postman, OpenAPI clients, and security questionnaires.

ARF mapping

Each ARF selective-disclosure primitive, mapped to a circuit you can integrate today.

ARF references are to the EU Commission's Architecture Reference Framework v1.4. Mapping is informational; consult your conformity assessor for certification-grade claims.

ARF concept

Predicate proofs on PID attributes

ARF v1.4 §6.5 — over-18, residency-bound predicates

zkRune circuit

age-verification · range-proof

Notes

Prove `age >= N` or `attribute ∈ [min, max]` without revealing the attribute. Already in production for age-verification today.

ARF concept

Group membership / inclusion proofs

ARF v1.4 §6.6 — qualification, group affiliation

zkRune circuit

membership-proof

Notes

Poseidon Merkle tree, depth=16. Issuer publishes a root; holders prove inclusion without revealing the underlying identifier. Production-safe when the root is published by a trusted issuer.

ARF concept

Credential attestation binding

ARF v1.4 §5.3 — Electronic Attestation of Attributes

zkRune circuit

credential-proof · signature-verification

Notes

Holder proves possession of a valid issuer-signed credential plus that the credential has not expired, without revealing the credential contents.

ARF concept

Selective disclosure of qualified electronic signature

ARF v1.4 §5.5 — QES with selective disclosure

zkRune circuit

signature-verification

Notes

EdDSA inside a ZK circuit. Prove a signature is valid for a held credential without revealing the signing key or full document.

ARF concept

Unlinkability across relying parties

ARF v1.4 §7 — privacy properties

zkRune circuit

hash-preimage

Notes

Same holder produces unlinkable proofs to different verifiers using per-session nullifiers derived from a hashed secret.

Readiness

Production today. Honest about what is still on the audit roadmap.

Audited circuits

14 production Groth16 circuits

Compiled with Circom, trusted setup completed via multi-party Phase 1 (Hermez Powers of Tau, 54 contributors) + Phase 2 (zkRune-side).

Proof generation

0.4–5 seconds in-browser

WASM proving runtime works on desktop and mobile. Average age-verification proof: ~200 ms on modern hardware.

Proof size

~200 bytes

Compact, verifiable on resource-constrained relying-party servers. <2 ms verification per proof.

Mainnet anchors

Solana · Base · Sui

Verification keys are immutable on three independent chains. Any party can independently verify the proof against the canonical vKey.

Licence

MIT / Apache-2.0

Open source by default. Compatible with EU NGI Commons and NLnet requirements. No vendor lock-in.

Audit

Q3–Q4 2026 (planned)

Third-party security audit scheduled. Honest disclosure of current posture at /trust — including what we have not yet proved.

What zkRune deliberately does not do

We stay in our lane. The list below is what wallet vendors, issuers, and member-state pilots already do — adding zkRune to your stack should not crowd out the work you have already done.

  • ×The wallet UI / UX surface (Atos, Talao, Walt.id and others own that)
  • ×Biometric onboarding or device key management
  • ×Qualified trust service provider approval process
  • ×Member-state pilot programme administration
  • ×EAA issuance UIs for authorities (we provide the circuits underneath)
Mainnet anchors

Verification keys on three independent chains.

The vKeys served by the hosted verifier are the same ones anchored on Base, Solana, and Sui mainnet. Relying parties can re-verify any proof against the on-chain key without trusting zkRune's hosted endpoint.

Evaluating zkRune for an EUDI Wallet integration?

We work directly with wallet implementers, qualified trust service providers, and relying-party engineering teams. The fastest path is a 30-minute technical session with a security-questionnaire response packet ready before the call.

zkruneprotocol@gmail.com · @rune_zk on X · github.com/louisstein94/zkrune